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ABSTRACT  
Am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges wurde die Zukunft der Kolonien global ein bedeutendes The-
ma. Dem Beispiel von Lloyd George und Woodrow Wilson folgend, begannen auch die italie-
nischen Politiker dieses Thema zu diskutieren. Im Zentrum stand besonders Libyen, wo während 
des Krieges ein breitflächiger Aufstand stattfand und dessen Zukunft besonders unentschieden 
schien. An der Diskussion war hauptsächlich die Kolonialverwaltung beteiligt, allerdings fand 
die Debatte auch in der Zivilgesellschaft Widerhall. Man wurde sich der vergangenen Fehler 
bewusst: die rücksichtslose Unterdrückung des Widerstandes der Einheimischen sowie der 
Despotismus des Militärregimes, weswegen die Frage nach indigener Beteiligung und Selbst-
verwaltung vernachlässigt worden war. Am Ende des Krieges wurden die Statuti Libici verkün-
det. Es waren drei regionale Verfassungen, die eine neue Form der indirekten Verwaltung in 
den kolonisierten Gebieten und eine offene Haltung gegenüber den lokalen Repräsentations-
organen vorsahen.
In the final year of the First World War, the debate on the future of colonial territories 
emerged in a new form, invoking the principle of self-determination. On 5 January 
1918, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George referred to the future of the German 
colonies, affirming that: 
The governing consideration […] in all these cases must be that the inhabitants should 
be placed under the control of an administration, acceptable to themselves, one of whose 
main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists 
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or governments. The natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and 
councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus 
to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal. The general principle 
of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of oc-
cupied European territories.1
On 9 January, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, sent a message for 
“world peace”, outlining a new vision for colonial empires. Published at a time when the 
fate of the postwar world was not clear, Wilson’s message proposed a universal goal:
What we demand in this war […] is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be 
made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving 
nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be 
assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and 
selfish aggression.2
Wilson proposed fourteen points for the recovery of world peace. These points were to 
be implemented through an agreement among all countries. For the colonial territories, 
the fifth point was particularly important, which affirmed the need for 
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based 
upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sover-
eignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equita-
ble claims of the government whose title is to be determined.3
The twelfth point also concerned colonial matters, particularly Italian territories in Lib-
ya:
the […] nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.4
The colonial question was also debated within the British left. The issue was discussed 
by the Labour Party and the Trade Unions at the beginning of 1918. On 16 January, the 
Labour Party sent the Russian people a message which stated that “the British people 
accept[ed] the principle of self-determination with respect to the British empire”5.
German Chancellor Hertling also addressed the issue in replying to Wilson and Lloyd 
1 British War Aims. Statement by the Right Honourable David Lloyd George […]. Authorized Version as published 
by the British Government, New York 1918, p. 6. It is interesting to remark that the Lloyd George‘s speech is 
copied in the diary of the Italian Minister of the Colonies, Gaspare Colosimo. See V. Clodomiro (ed.), Il diario di 
Gaspare Colosimo Ministro delle Colonie (1916–1919), Roma 2012, p. 442. David Lloyd George (186–1945) 
played a prominent role in the peace conference that led to the Treaty of Versailles (29 June 1919), where were 
taken initial steps towards the establishment of the League of Nations.
2 T. W. Wilson (1856–1924) was elected president in 1912 and reelected in 1916. He decided to enter the war (6 
April 1917) and was the main promoter of the League of Nations. Ibid., p. 97.
 Ibid, p. 97.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, p. 44 and 506. 
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George. During a session of the Reichstag on 25 January, he noted that Wilson’s fifth 
point would bring serious difficulties for Britain and France, the two major imperialist 
powers allied with the United States. He even promised that a victorious Germany would 
raise the issue in the peace conference, thereby redefining the destinies of the colonial 
territories and their administrations.6
It was Wilson’s speech, which aroused the greatest echo in international political circles. 
In Italy, the points on colonial possessions did not provoke an immediate reflection. The 
Ministry of the Colonies, however, did not overlook that Turkey could deploy Wilsonian 
principles and “bring up again into question the Libyan issue”7. Internationally, the 
Libyan question had already been reopened by the Ottoman Porte immediately after the 
Italian declaration of war: the Turkish government had notified the Italians that it no 
longer accepted the agreement of Ouchy8 and considered the Libyan territories as parts 
of its Empire.
This paper analyzes the Italian debate on the future of the colonies during the last years 
of the First World War, and its consequences in colonial policy. Particularly, it focusses 
on the Libyan territories, which posed the most urging problems. While Eritrea and 
Somalia did not witness conflicts serious enough to question colonial government, Libya 
saw profound upheavals and conflicts. These unrests highlighted the shortcomings in 
political management, especially in relation to the local population. These shortcomings 
and errors, combined with the local political forces’ almost universal support for the 
Ottoman Porte and the Central Empires, resulted in almost all of Libya escaping from 
Italian control during the conflict. In the most dramatic moments of the war, especially 
after the disaster of Caporetto, Italy even thought of abandoning it 9. After deciding to 
retain its presence in Libya, the Italian government made profound revisions to its colo-
nial policy. The result of these policies was a slightly liberal opening, which involved the 
Libyan population and their representatives in a form of indirect rule, and gave wider 
space to local autonomy and political expression.
When Italy declared war (24 May 1915), Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were in a criti-
cal situation. From the last months of 1914, all of the Fezzan (the Saharan region that 
constituted a large part of the territory claimed by Italy), had been in the hands of the 
‘rebels’. The ‘rebellion’10 extended to the North of Tripolitania. In the first months of 
1915, the Italian garrisons were under attack almost anywhere. Rome, for its part, ech-
oed the government’s position on the withdrawal of the garrisons. In fact, preparations 
  6 George Earl of Hertling (184–1919) was the German Chancellor from November 1917 to October of the follow-
ing year. Idib., p. 444.
  7 Ibid., p. 427. 
  8 After about a year of war, the Ottoman government had to come to terms with the Italian government by sign-
ing 18 October 1912 in Ouchy (near Lausanne) a peace treaty and withdrawing his troops from Libya.
  9 The government opposed the request by General Cadorna: a Council of Ministers on  November 1917, unani-
mously voted that the troops could “not either in whole or in part, be removed from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica”. 
See Ibid., p. 9.
10 The ‘rebellion’ was so defined by journalism and colonial discourse, with a term that emphasized illegality. We 
assume it, on the contrary, as an act of resistance fully legitimate: hence, our quotation marks. 
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for the war foreshadowed the movement of troops in the battlefields of Europe. During 
the summer, the troops were ordered to retreat to the coast; only the two maritime bases 
of Tripoli and al-Khums (Homs) remained under the control of the army. 
Retreat had been ordered even in Cyrenaica, and in October 1915 Italian troops held 
only Benghazi, Darnah and Tubruq. The government of the tariqa al-Sanusiyya under 
Ahmad al-Sharif effectively controlled the rest of the territory11. 
This situation did not change for about a year, but in 1916, some events signalled a turn-
ing point for the Italian government. In Tripolitania, a part of the Berber population sur-
rendered, and Italian troops occupied the town of Zuara, west of Tripoli. In Cyrenaica, 
Muhammad Hilal, one of the Sanusi family members, defected. Italy therefore could 
peacefully occupy Burd Sulayman (Porto Bardia) and part of the internal area. Ahmad 
al-Sharif, refusing all Italian approaches for a peaceful settlement, committed most of 
his forces with Turkish and German military commands, organizing an armed campaign 
against Egypt12. The shaykh al-kabir reached the oasis of Dakhla, but his campaign ended 
disastrously in early 1917, and the remnants of his militia retreated to Cyrenaica.
This failed expedition badly shook the authority of the Sanusi chief, who moved west-
ward to the region of Surt, continuing the fight alongside the Ottoman caliphate. Con-
trol over the brotherhood in Cyrenaica passed into the hands of Muhmmad Idris13, who 
was more inclined to negotiations with Britain and Italy. In April 1917, an agreement 
was devised in Bir ‘Akrama, near Tubruk. Muhammad Idris and the tribes loyal to him 
agreed to a proposal of modus vivendi with Italy upon the end of the war, thereby ensur-
ing peace in Eastern Libya.
In Tripolitania, the situation remained difficult. Despite the occupation of Zuara, the 
‘Arab rebels’ under the leadership of Sulayman al-Baruni14 and other chiefs (such as Ra-
madan al-Suwayhili15) and assisted by Turkish and German officers had established their 
logistic centre in Misrata. They kept all territory firmly in control, besieging the coastal 
towns occupied by colonial forces.
In 1918, the colonial administration began to reflect on the program proposed by Wil-
son and others about the future of the colonies. The Colonial Secretary Gaspare Co-
losimo,16 in a message to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 1918, analysed the 
various positions, claiming not to see
11 Through the initiative of its founder, Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Sanusi, from the mid-nineteenth century the tariqa 
al-sanusiyya (or Sanusi brotherhood) spread gradually the net of its zawaya in eastern Libya. It was the only 
organized institution truly present in a territory barely controlled by Istanbul.
12 See F. Cresti, La Tariqa al-sanusiyya nella Prima Guerra Mondiale. La Campagna d’Egitto di Ahmad al-Sharif al-
Sanusi (novembre 1915–february 1917) secondo i documenti d’archivio italiani, in: Studi Magrebini, XI (201), 
pp. 41-9.
1 Muhammad Idris (1890–198) became the independent ruler of Libya in 1951.
14 Sulayman al-Baruni (1872–1940) had been elected to Parliament in Istanbul after the coup of the Committee of 
Union and Progress (1908). 
15 Ramadan al-Shitiwi al-Suwayhili had inflicted the greatest defeat in Libya to the Italian army at Qasr Bu Hadi (29 
April 1915).
16 Gaspare Colosimo (1859–1944) was the Colonial Secretary from 1916 to 1919.
What Future for Italian Libya? The Debate on Colonial Policy, 1918–1920 | 77
how the principle of self-determinationcan can be practically implemented; this kind of 
indigenous referendum would be of little value even among well-evolved populations17.
Considering that Britain and France had the greatest risk if this principle was applied, he 
affirmed his clear opposition to it:
I do not hesitate to declare that it is in the common interest of the Entente to not bring the 
argument of self decision to the discussion [in the future Peace Congress]18.
It was evident that the colonial question would have great importance in the interna-
tional agreements about the future of the world. The Italian government needed to arrive 
prepared at the negotiations, and to resist being pushed aside by France and Britain in 
the debate on colonial territories.19
The situation in Tripolitania influenced Colosimo’s opposition to the self-determination 
hypothesis. If self-determination was upheld, Tripolitania, in all probability, would be 
lost. In his analysis, the minister noted that Eritrea and Somalia had proven loyalty to It-
aly. Cyrenaica, however, could possibly remain with Italy. The minister believed that the 
treaties with the Sanusi brotherhood, the new politics of luring tribes with money, and 
the development of local representative institutions had created a new situation “which 
gave hope that the people don’t have to regret the ancient Turkish domination.”20
This analysis appears quite optimistic, if not wrong, for Cyrenaica. The minister was 
more cautious in his report to the Parliament a few days later, affirming that the situa-
tion passed
through a very delicate political moment, in which our government must dominate, 
combine and organize. It’s impossibile to make predictions, always fallacious […] but, 
whatever the events, we can say that since the start of the good relations with the Sanusis 
we have had a year of peace. Life in the colony, for the first time since our occupation 
(since1911) began to throb in works of peace, agriculture and trade, even during the 
war, leaving behind the memory of a wretched life linked to the coast garrisons, unable to 
develop any fruitful relationship with the interior and of any government action.21
The reasoning seemed more consistent for Tripolitania, also involving the neighboring 
French and British territories:
Although appropriate providences of indigenous politics have been introduced in Tripoli, 
with the establishment of local advisory committees, with the code of the Jewish com-
munity, with the organization of Aukaf and other provisions, the conditions are very 
17 Colosimo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 1918; see V. Clodomiro (ed.), Il diario di Gaspare Colosimo, p. 
444).
18 Ibid.
19 Colosimo to Minister of Foreign Affairs,  June 1918, in Ibid., p. 507.
20 Ibid., p. 445.
21 Relazione sulla situazione economica, politica ed amministrativa delle Colonie italiane presentata dal Ministro 
delle Colonie (Colosimo) nella tornata del 2 febbraio 1918, in: Atti Parlamentari, XXIV, 191–1918, n. LV, Roma 
1918, p. 14 [hereinafter Colosimo Report]. 
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different in the region where the rebellion of 1915 has reduced us to the coast and only 
to a part of it, making us lose all control over populations outside the walls of the coastal 
cities. One application of the criteria set out in the above discourse, as it were possible, 
would be a serious danger not only for Italians interests, but also for those of neighboring 
French and British possessions22.
While it was in Italy’s interest to not introduce the question of self determination at the 
Peace Congress, the minister accepted that the issue might be raised in other forums. 
In any case, it was important for the government to discuss the problem, gathering all 
the information and facts needed for a valid defense, in case the affair took directions 
unfavorable to Italian interests. 
Beyond the debate on Wilson’s points, which some saw as a philosophical pronounce-
ment difficult to enact politically, some liberal opening in European colonial policies had 
begun to take shape.
France had not yet made official statements on the proposals of Wilson. However, with 
the arrival of Clemenceau23, some administrative reforms for Algeria’s Muslim popula-
tion were announced. On 29 January 1918, France promised partial electoral rights to 
the Muslim population. Unlike the previous legislation, this measure recognized a kind 
of naturalization to the indigènes without the obligation of renouncing their personal 
status. It promised the establishment of the Advisory Council for Algeria in Paris, com-
posed of six Muslims and fifteen French members24.
The decree was issued on 4 February 1919. It created an indigenous citizen status through 
which some categories of Algerian Muslims became eligible voters in municipal constitu-
encies. French politicians who promoted this liberal reform defended their position by 
citing generally progressive political principles and by noting the need to recognize and 
repay a military debt that France had contracted towards the Muslim subjects of Algeria. 
Thousands had been enrolled and had fought (indeed, were still fighting) for the moth-
erland, shedding their blood in trenches and battlefields of Europe. It is interesting to 
note that even in the report presented to the Italian Parliament on the situation of the 
colonies at the end of February 1918, Colosimo stressed the important effort made by 
the Libyans during the war in favor of the motherland25. Since 1917, indigenous Liby-
ans had been sent to Italy. They worked in major industries engaged in war production; 
more than 4,700 workers worked in the large industrial centers, and in southern cities.26 
The number of Libyan workers brought in Italy was not conspicuous in absolute terms, 
especially in comparison with the other countries. But taking into account the small size 
22 Ibid.
2 Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) from 1917 to 1919 was Prime Minister in a cabinet of national unity.
24 On the debate about this reform proposal, see Ch.-R. Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaine, vol. II, Paris 
1919, pp. 270-276.
25 Colosimo Report, p. 1.
26 See F. Cresti, La Prima Emigrazione di Lavoratori Maghrebini in Italia, in: M. Aymard, F. Barca (eds.), Conflitti, Mi-
grazioni e Diritti dell’Uomo, Soveria Mannelli 2002, pp. 47-59.
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of the area effectively controlled by Italy, Libyans constituted a substantial part of its 
adult male population.
 Colosimo devoted great attention to the future of colonial administration, especially 
regarding measures to foster a policy of collaboration with indigenous peoples. He men-
tioned the Ordinamento Bertolin, the first decrees issued for governing the colony. The 
Bertolini system comprised two decrees, issued in 1913 and 191427; the second one, 
in particular, recommended governing the country with the cooperation of indigenous 
leaders28. However, Bertolini’s administrative structure gave the Libyans only a role of 
practical execution, while decision-making and management were reserved for Italian 
officials. The local councils were meant to facilitate the expression of Libyan aspirations, 
but in the short period separing the first Italian-Turkish conflict from the World War, the 
Ordinamento had not fostered any real participation of Libyan representatives. Instead, a 
succession of military governors had retained highly centralized and authoritarian pow-
ers, repressing all dissent.
The Minister cited many excuses for the failure of Bertolini’s laws: the lack of time, the 
continuing instability in the country, the outbreak of the ‘rebellion’ in Tripolitania and 
the inability to control the territory in Cyrenaica. The beginning of the First World 
War subsequently led to the suspension of all civilian measures. Nevertheless, the theory 
formulated before the war remained sound, although subsequent events in 1915 had 
invalidated it.
In Libya we are few among many, like in most African and Indian colonies, and [...] we 
must proceed by guiding the people, not putting them aside29.
The position expressed by the minister and his considerations presaged a more liberal 
direction in Libyan politics. This position resulted from a lively debate on indigenous 
policy. The question of the relations with the Muslim population had attracted the inter-
est of politicians since the conquest of Tripoli. The most debated issues were the religious 
affiliation of the population and the degree to which the history, legal tradition and Mus-
lim institutions had to be preserved to make Italian rule acceptable. In case of Cyrenaica, 
the history of the Sanusiyya, its resistance to the occupation, its internal organization and 
its relations with the Italian government had aroused interest.
 All such analyses argued for active participation of the indigenous population in gov-
ernmental bodies, and the recognition of wider civil rights. The jurist Savino Acquaviva, 
for exemple, contradicted a widely held view by affirming that the Libyan uprising and 
its support for the Ottoman Empire and the Entente powers had not been caused by 
well-organized propaganda, but was in fact the result of a colonial policy which had 
27 Decreto 9, 9 January 191 and Decreto 5, 15 January 1914. See the texts in Ministero delle Colonie, Ordina-
menti della Libia, Roma 1914.
28 Ministero delle Colonie, Nel primo anno di vita del Ministero delle Colonie. Relazione dell’on. Pietro Bertolini, 
Roma 1914, p. VI [hereinafter Bertolini Report].
29 Ibid. See also A. Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Libia. Tripoli Bel Suol d‘Amore 1860–1922, Milano, 1997, p. 56.
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degraded Libyans from citizenship to subjecthood with no political rights30. According 
to Acquaviva, the way forward was a policy of cooperation and affirmation of the just 
demands for the country’s progress, along with an ultimate acceptance of Libya’s political 
and religious independence. That did not mean the complete detachment of the Libyan 
territories from Italy: these could still remain parts of the Italian Empire, just as Australia 
and Canada were parts of the British Empire. It was thus appropriate to move towards 
an indirect rule policy, following Great Britain’s example.
Beyond the theoretical debate, even the military government of the colony during the 
war years was increasingly convinced of the necessity of establishing advisory bodies, 
permitting Libyans to express their opinions and wishes. In April 1916, General Ameglio 
(who ran the government of the two colonies during the war) proposed an administrative 
reform along such lines.31 The Ministry of Colonies implemented his proposal, creating 
the Indigenous Advisory Committees (Comitati consultivi indigeni) in Tripoli and Beng-
hazi in March 1917. A Joint Central Advisory Committee for Libya (Comitato centrale 
consultivo misto per la Libia), based in Rome, was later joined to the latter.
Alongside the debate on the future of the colonies, the Italian government created the 
‘Committee for the study of the measures for the transition from the state of war to 
that of peace’ on 21 March 191832. The committee was divided into different sections. 
Section VII advised on the study of ‘Colonial Issues’ (Questioni coloniali), enlightening 
the public and counselling the government on policies to be adopted after the war. It 
included experts, members of the Academy, members of Parliament and senior ministry 
officials, and published its reports in 191933.
The first session was inaugurated by the Minister of the Colonies, who recalled the dra-
matic situation caused by the war, and hoped that the League of Nations, “like a ray of 
light in the terrible tragedy of the world”, would solve all international problems and 
usher in an era of peace. For that to happen, however, it was necessary to find solutions 
to problems which maintained divisions between peoples and nations. Here the colonial 
question was of paramount importance34. For Italy, the Mediterranean remained the 
center of interest and the future of Libya was a key question. Hence, the members of the 
section dealt chiefly with territories on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Tripoli-
tania and Cyrenaica), tackling issues relating to the relations with the populations of the 
two colonies:
0 S. Acquaviva, Il Problema Libico e il Senussismo, Roma 1917, passim.
1 Archivio storico-diplomatico del ministero degli Affari esteri [hereinafter: ASDMAE], Archivio storico del ministe-
ro dell’Africa italiana [hereinafter: ASMAI], Libia 126/1, b. 6. See also S. Behre, Notabili Libici e Funzionari Italiani: 
l’Amministrazione Coloniale in Tripolitania (1912–1919), PhD Thesis, XXIV cycle (2009–2011), University of Messi-
na, pp. 01-08.
2 Documents of the Commissione per lo studio dei provvedimenti occorrenti per il passaggio dallo stato di guer-
ra a quello di pace in Archivio Centrale dello Stato [hereinafter ACS], Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri [herei-
nafter: PCM] (Gabinetto, Affari generali), Guerra Europea, b. 269 bis, 04.
 Ministero delle Colonie, Relazione della VII sezione della commissione del dopo-guerra (Quistioni coloniali), 
Roma 1919 [hereinafter: Section VII Report], p. 1. 
4 Ibid., p. 7-8.  
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Our Muslim politics. Here’s an interesting problem […] concerning […] the road we 
have traveled, worrying about remaining faithful to the policy of collaboration that ac-
cording to the needs of the times and the maturity of the peoples, allows them a gradual 
development of their civilization; and respects the special contents of the Muslim reli-
gion […]. The future […] of our colonies […] will depend largely on our Muslim policy 
and our indigenous policy35. 
In his reply to the minister, the section president Carlo Schanzer remembered the colo-
nial events of the past decades and concluded 
hoping that Italy, not slavishly following the methods of the other nations, will know 
how to give his own imprint to a colonial policy responding to its civilization and special 
aptitudes, so that this work becomes the effective instrument of our colonial expansion 
corresponding to the position and mission of Italy in the world36.
The arguments of Section VII covered a very broad field. Schanzer covered the Ministry 
of the Colonies and its advisory bodies. His report was critical of the Indigenous advisory 
committees for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which the minister Colosimo had hailed as 
crucial elements of the new indigenous policy.
These committees sought to involve “the indigenous element, and in particular the Mus-
lims” in the colonial government bodies, fulfilling the pledges taken since the beginning 
of the conquest of Tripoli37. However, the real representation of indigenous interests was 
somewhat problematic. Committee members were appointed by the government, which 
chose between “notables welcomed by the Governor and those proposed by him”38. It 
was possible that the members had no real independence, but were just puppets in the 
hands of Italian officials. The people regarded them as agents of the colonial power, not 
as their representatives.
The Convegno nazionale coloniale, held in Rome in January 1919, discussed the crea-
tion of a truly representative body of indigenous interests. Section VII also proposed an 
elected assembly, stressing that future “indigenous advisory committees will be based 
entirely on the election”39.
Among the reports of Section VII, the one by Carlo Alfonso Nallino’40 stands out, titled 
Treatment of the Natives and their participation in the colonial administration. Political and 
administrative system41.
5 Ibid, p. 9.
6 Ibid., p. 18.
7 Ibid., p. 12. On the civil legislation enacted by the first colonial governments in Libya, see D. Caruso Inghilleri, 
I Primi Ordinamenti Civili della Libia (5 ottobre 1911–9 gennaio 191). Contributo alla Storia della Conquista, 
Roma 1914. 
8 Section VII Report, p. 5.
9 Ibid. 
40 Carlo Alfonso Nallino was one of the most illustrious orientalists, and professor of Arabic in the University of 
Rome.
41 Section VII Report, p. 111-124
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Nallino devoted most of his report to Libya, stating that it was not necessary to intro-
duce major political and administrative transformations in other colonies. He recalled 
that the Ministry of Colonies had agreed to this and had repeatedly stressed the need for 
implementation and development of the measures since 1914. On the issue of the politi-
cal status of the Libyan population, it was necessary to examine a classic conundrum: 
should Italy preserve the institute of sudditanza (subjection)42, or move towards a model 
of cittadinanza (citizenship)? In other words, was it possible to unify the legal status of 
Italian and indigenous citizens?
Nallino stressed that the concept of sudditanza was not acceptable in Libya, and that 
the situation must evolve toward cittadinanza. There would be a particular Libyan citi-
zenship for the entire native population, distinct from metropolitan citizenship. The 
distinction was based on the observation that Libyans would not accept the Italian Civil 
Law, since its acceptance would mean the abandonment of the rules related to Muslim 
or Jewish law.
The personal property and inheritance laws in Muslim and Jewish legal traditions were 
often different from those applied in Italy, so it was impossible for one to subscribe to 
both. On the other hand, Nallino remembered that from the beginning of the conquest 
the government’s agreements with the main Libyan leaders had shown the differential 
treatment of Italians and Libyans. Muslim women were prohibited from marrying into 
other religions, laws on conscription and military service were non-applicable, family 
laws corresponding to their religious tradition were enforced, and religious endowments 
(awqaf) received special treatment 43. This made it clear that even the Muslims did not 
wish to be completely assimilated with the Italians.
According to Nallino, citizenship for Libyans needed to be based on a juridical status 
guaranteeing the essential rights, “without prejudice to their personal property and in-
heritance law, as established respectively by the Muslim and the Jewish laws”44. Nallino 
thought that the example of French Algeria must not be followed in Libya. The law 
allowing Algerians to access full French nationality through an explicit renunciation of 
their Muslim status, if applied to Libya, “[would] stir up the natives of Libya against us, 
since it is an invitation to apostasy”45.
Nallino criticized the indigenous advisory committees. He thought that they were results 
of the conflict between the central and the colonial governments, the latter excluding the 
elective principle and leaving the choice of the members to the Governor. The Governor 
had the right to dismiss them and to suspend their payments, and therefore the members 
42 The rd. 6 Avril 191 already cited, introduced the institute of sudditanza for the entire native population. The 
sudditanza took away any political right for the Libyans, while under Ottoman rule, starting from 1908, they had 
enjoyed full citizenship.
4 See G. Bourbon del Monte Santa Maria, L’Islamismo e la Confraternita dei Senussi, Città di Castello, 1912, p. 2-
28.
44 Section VII Report, p. 114.
45 Ibid., p. 115.
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of the committees had no independence. This state could only be changed by introduc-
ing the election of the members. 
The rapporteur opposed joint assemblies, since the diversity of cultures and political 
agendas might result in perpetual disagreement between the Italian and Libyan mem-
bers46. All ideas of  assimilation were to be abandoned, since they “would not only be 
doomed to failure, but also create a violent hostility against us”. Finally, Nallino recom-
mended the elimination of assimilative tendencies, the introduction of a ‘Libyan citizen-
ship’ for all the natives, their right to work in public service, the extension of the repre-
sentative system, the preservation of differentiated administrative systems, and the study 
“of Bedouin or nomadic societies, which constitutes a very serious problem of internal 
Cyrenaica and in part of Fezzan”47.
There was a paradox in the debate within Section VII. While it advocated a policy of 
association and collaboration with the Muslim population, no Libyan representative was 
consulted. Nallino did not think that members of Libyan society had expressed their 
wishes independently, voicing aspirations which contradicted the scholars. For exam-
ple, some notables of Tripoli had requested rights equivalent with those of metropolitan 
citizens after the Peace of Ouchy. They had also called for the establishment of mixed 
representative bodies, having sent a memorial to the head of the Italian Government, 
Giovanni Giolitti, and asking that the Arabs
be not considered as a colonized people, but be given perfect equality of treatment with 
right to vote and representation, by organizing local power on the basis of a mixed board 
composed of Arabs and Italian and provided with broad powers48. 
Other politicians for independence, like Sulayman al-Baruni, had a more radical atti-
tude. In the last months of 1912, he declared the Berber region and the entire southern 
Tripolitanian region independent, executing “the desire of the majority of the coastal 
population of Tripoli, and of all the inhabitants of Jebel Garbi, of south of Tripoli till the 
Sahara and Fezzan”. Enacting the text of a Sultan’s firman “clearly granting independence 
to the people of Tripoli,” al-Baruni proclaimed the birth of “a government founded on 
the law of the Koran and on principles inspired by civilization and progress that will be 
modulated on those of civilized nations”49.
This proclamation was the first instance of independence of a part of Libya. It followed 
the meeting of several Berber notables organized by al-Baruni in Yefren on 8 November 
1912. We do not know if this republican idea was widespread among Berber notables; 
46 “Mixed Assemblies seem premature and harmful”, Ibid., p. 120.
47 Ibid., pp. 12-124.
48 G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d’Italia, I vol., Roma, 1924, p. 28. 
49 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 150/14-59: Ufficio politico-militare del governo della Tripolitania, Notizie su Suleimàn el-
Barùni, att. n. 4, p. 9. The proclamation is presented as a logical consequence of the Sultan’ firman that, two days 
before signing the Treaty of Ouchy, gave Libya a full and complete autonomy. See F. Cresti, Due Volte Minoranza: 
i Berberi Ibaditi del Jabal Nafűsa nella Visione Coloniale, in: F. Cresti (ed.), Minoranze, Pluralismo, Stato nell’Africa 
Mediterranea e nel Sahel, Roma, 2015, p. .
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we are also not sure if it was merely al-Baruni’s tool for realizing personal ambitions, or 
even a reformulation of an earlier idea about an independent Berber State50. In effect, 
the Yefren republic was short-lived, and disappeared a few months later due to colonial 
occupation.
In Tripolitania, the republican idea probably had other stimuli, such as Wilson’s Four-
teen Points and, later, the military command of the colony statement, which wanted 
the country’s future to be determined by a political solution and with the agreement of 
the population51. The republican idea found a new expression on 16 November 1918. 
During a meeting of the main military leaders of Tripolitania in al-Qusabat, Sulayman 
al-Baruni and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam52 proclaimed the Tripolitanian Republic (jum-
huriyya al-tarabulusiyya). 
According to Lisa Anderson53, the formation of a republican government was not a 
product of the ideology of the al-Qusabat conference participants, but rather a reflection 
of disagreements on who should head the independent state. Temporarily, a quadrumvi-
rate was formed, composed of Sulayman al-Baruni, Ramadan al-Suwayhili, Abd al-Nabi 
Bilkhayr and Ahmad al-Murayyid, along with an advisory board of 24 members. Accord-
ing to the reconstruction of Simona Behre
the adoption of the republican formula was an obligatory choice; it was an attempt to 
defuse the centrifugal forces that threatened to trigger a new civil war. The decision to set 
up a collegial summit confirmed that this danger was a real one. The composition of the 
Quadrumvirate perfectly captured the political dynamics of the country54.
 While Anderson and Behre see the Tripolitanian republic as a tool for maintaining the 
balance of power among the main political factions of the country, Mondaini explains 
it as “a wartime artificial Turkish-German creation”, which led to future peace negotia-
tions, but also responded to the political ideas of its time, such as the renewal movement 
spreading from Turkey to the entire Islamic world through the Young Turks, the spread 
of Wilsonian principles of freedom and self-determination of peoples, and the liberal 
political reforms of the post-war in the French and English colonies.55
In fact, when the Ottoman command left the scene after the Armistice of Mudros (30 
October 1918), the quadrumvirs autonomously ruled the territory that they could con-
trol. The republic was not the result of a common political vision beyond the leaders’ as-
50 See F. Corò, Suleiman El Baruni, il Sogno di un Principato Berbero e la Battaglia di Asàaba (191), in: Gli Annali 
dell’Africa italiana, 1 (198) -4, p. 958. 
51 See E. De Leone, La Colonizzazione dell’Africa del Nord, 2 vols., Padova 1960, vol. II, p. 481-482.
52 The Egyptian ‚Abd al-Rahman ‚Azzam studied medicine in Britain. During World War I he went to Libya, becom-
ing the counsellor of Ramadan al-Suwayhili. Many years later, in 1945, he was elected the first Secretary General 
of the Arab League.
5 L. Anderson, The Tripoli Republic, 1918–1922, in: E.G.H. Joffé, K.S. Maclachlan (eds.), Social and Economic Devel-
opment of Libya, London 1982, p. 4-66.
54 S. Behre, Notabili Libici e Funzionari Italiani: l‘Amministrazione Coloniale in Tripolitania (1912–1919), Soveria 
Mannelli, 2015, p. 269. 
55 G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d’Italia, p. 424. 
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pirations to supremacy. Al-Suwayhili, an inspiration for ‘Azzam, probably had the major 
role in the Republican project formulation. With this tool, he had
the possibility of dismissing the regional leader’s clothes to rise to the rank of national 
leader, extending his hegemony over entire Tripolitania. The implementation of this plan 
called for a renewal of institutional structures, as the organization that [...] had im-
planted in and around Misrâta could not support the weight of governing the whole 
country56.
However, several other actors with similar ambitions competed with him, and no one 
was willing to give way to others. The following events of the Tripolitanian republic 
demonstrate that while the supporters of the republic hoped to express their aspirations 
for independence at the Peace conference, their efforts were in vain.
The shaykh al-kabir of the Sanusiyya, Ahmad al-Sharif, hoped that Wilson’s fifth point 
could be used to gain the autonomy of Libyan territories. When the war events did 
signal a defeat for the Turko-German forces, he journeyed to Istanbul to plead his cause 
(September 1918)57. We do not know how Ahmad al-Sharif carried out his action in 
Istanbul. However, messages sent by the British Embassy in Rome to the Ministry of 
the Colonies in November 1918 made the Italian Government fear that the Ottomans 
wanted to apply the principle of self-determination during post-war negotiations regard-
ing the future of its former African territories.
The Sultan of Turkey would appoint Sidi Ahmad al-Sharif as the deputy sultan of Tripoli, 
with the intention and hope to intervene in the treaties of peace with a request of evacu-
ation of the Libyan territories, under the pretext that the occupation of this country is 
contrary to the will of the population and therefore not in accordance with the principles 
of the US President58.
Whether this information was true or not, the Italian government was on guard against 
the maneuvers that could jeopardize the future of Libya59.
In Cyrenaica, Idris al-Sanusi assumed the control of the brotherhood and aspired to a 
broad autonomy, if not complete independence. He wished to be titled “Emir” of his 
territory. He had repeatedly asked for the creation of “a Sanusi kingdom under Italian 
protectorate (like the Khedive in Egypt)”60, recognizing the political and military free-
56 Ibid.
57 E.A.V. De Candole, The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya, Publ. by Mohamed Ben Ghalbon, Manchester, 1990, 
p. 5-6.
58 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 140/, fasc. 19: Rodd to Agnesa, 11 January 1918.
59 A Turkish official statement addressed to the Italian government through the embassy of Spain in Istanbul in 
April 1918, with the reassertion of Ottoman suzerainty over Libya, made the Minister of the Colonies believe 
that “basically, Turkey prepares the ground for reopening the issue of Libya in the Peace congress, trying to 
demonstrate the territorial reconquest of Tripolitania”, See V. Clodomiro (ed.), Il Diario di Gaspare Colosimo, pp. 
495-496. 
60 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 18/2, f. 14: Relazione Piacentini-Villa sulle trattative di Zuetina (oct. 1916), p. 11. See also 
ibid., Libia 14/, f. 27: Serra to Ministero degli Esteri, 27 March 1916.
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dom of the internal regions of Cyrenaica. For the Italian Ministry of Colonies, the con-
cessions were further reduced for a certain administrative autonomy of the southernmost 
territory of Cyrenaica. But Idris had stuck to his initial plan even after the conclusion 
of the modus vivendi of 1917. Even in early 1919, he wanted the title “amir dawakhil 
Libya” (Emir of the internal regions of Libya), but the ministry saw in this request a 
“Wilsonian maneuver” and was ready to concede only the less binding title of “sceikh 
al-tariqa” (Head of Sanusi brotherhood), with administrative autonomy in the oases of 
Kufra and Jalu61.
The positions of the Italian Ministry of Colonies and the most active political forces in 
Libya were therefore quite distant at the end of the First World War. It took diplomatic 
approaches, plea bargains and mutual concessions to reach an agreement that led to the 
proclamation of the Legge fondamentale (qanun al-asasi or Basic Law) for Tripolitania and 
for Cyrenaica, better known as Statuti libici.
The negotiations with the members of the Republican Quadrumvirate of Tripolitania 
began in March 1919 at Qal’at al-Zaytun, and reached an agreement based on recipro-
cal concessions. The Quadrumvirate returned Italian prisoners and pacified the territory 
with gradual disarmament of the armed forces of the republic. Italy, in turn, established 
new administrative rules that guaranteed the population a broad institutional participa-
tion in governing the country. The benefits were mutual: the Italian government avoided 
the military action in the colonies, while the leaders of the republic obtained substantial 
appanages without yielding power and autonomy, but recognizing a sort of protectorate 
to Italy. Moreover, Libyan leaders were aware that, with the Ottoman Empire and its al-
lies withdrawing at the end of the war, their ability to support a further war effort, such 
as obtaining supplies and arms, would be very limited.
The agreement was enforced by Ramadan al-Suwayhili, who persuaded the other leaders 
to sign it on April 21, 1919. It sparked controversy in Italy, especially when the political 
strategy advocated by the statutes proved unsuccessful. Many claimed that Italy should 
conquer the territory by military force, since the end of the European war allowed to 
move the necessary troops into the colony. Those who supported this line were convinced 
of the inability of the Libyan leaders to understand the actual value of the concession 
made by Italy peacefully. It was regarded as an act of weakness, for they were accustomed 
to acknowledge only the logic of force62.
The ideology of the Italian Government played a decisive role in its policy. The judgment 
of Gennaro Mondaini, who witnessed the debate of that era (and also participated in the 
drafting of the postwar policy as a member of the Committee), is well balanced:
Italy, where democratic ideals in domestic as well as in International and colonial politics 
had been among the most striking and effective coefficients of the heroic deeds [of World 
War], [was] politically and psychologically prepared for a great liberal political reform to 
61 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 144/4, f. 26: Ministero delle Colonie [hereinafter: MC] to Arcari, tel. 1204, 4 April 1919; 
Arcari to MC, tel. 912, 16 April 1919.
62 See G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d’Italia, vol. I, p. 425. 
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ensure the pacification of Tripolitania without having to reconquer it, especially as it was 
bound by the commitments made in the first Peace of Lausanne with Turkey and by the 
solemn promises repeatedly made to natives in the early years of the occupation63.
On June 1, 1919, a proclamation of General Vincenzo Garioni, the new governor of 
Tripolitania,64 announced to the population the opening of a new era:
His Majesty the King has signed and the minister of the Colonies has countersigned the 
decree that establishes the FUNDAMENTAL PACT for the people of Tripolitania.
It consecrates with intangible rules the wide and loyal fulfillment of those commitments, 
which due to known events beyond the will of the Italian government had been delayed, 
but not forgotten. By virtue of this Act, the inhabitants of Tripolitania are elevated to 
the moral and political dignity of citizens, guaranteed by the same rights recognized to 
Italian citizens and are called to contribute to the governance of public affairs and the 
administration of the territory in a wider and more concrete form in a regime of freedom 
and social progress, for them a sure pledge of a peaceful future65.
The Patto fondamentale for Tripolitania was a real Constitution. It was the first constitu-
tion in the Libyan territories, and it was also defined as such by the local population. 
It consists of forty articles66 and defines the criteria for recognizing Tripolitanian Italian 
citizenship. It claims, among other things, that all persons born in Tripolitania at the date 
of the decree, are considered Italian citizens (art. 1). All citizens are equal before the law, 
will maintain their own status concerning the right of the individual and the inheritance, 
and will enjoy the following civil and political rights: guarantee of individual freedom, 
inviolability of home and property, the right to participate in civil and military offices, 
free professional practice in Italy (on condition of having the necessary qualifications), 
the right to vote and to stand for the right of petition to the national Parliament, the 
right of residence, and the right to emigration.
In addition to guaranteeing respect for the religious traditions and local customs, the 
Pact recognizes freedom of press and assembly. As for military service, citizens cannot be 
forced to enrol, but they may enlist volunteers to form local armed forces. Tolls set by the 
Parliament must be used exclusively for the needs of Tripolitania.
As for education, the government would ensure the freedom of education and establish 
schools for compulsory primary education (being “restricted to males only” for Mus-
lims), set up courses for secondary and higher education. For Muslims, all elementary 
education and secondary scientific subjects would be taught in Arabic, while Italian 
would be compulsory; it would be forbidden to teach principles in conflict with Islam. 
6 Ibid., p. 424-425.
64 Garioni (who had already been governor of Tripolitania in the years 191 and 1914) replaced Giovanni Ameglio, 
from August 1918 until August of the following year.
65 Ibid. A copy of the notice in ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 122/22, f. 196.
66 Legge fondamentale per la Tripolitania. Al-qanun al-asasi li’l-qathar al-tarabulusi, 1st of June 1919, in ASDMAE, 
Asmai, Libia 122/22, fasc. 196.
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Articles 13 to 26 concerned the government and its administration. The government 
was to be formed by a governor appointed by the king and by a local parliament elected 
by the people for a four year term (the voters must be more than twenty years old) ; 
the number of members by right and gubernatorial appointment was not to exceed 
one-sixth of the elected members; the members must be older than thirty years and be 
Tripolitanian citizens; they were to be elected on the basis of one for every twenty thou-
sand inhabitants, and the chairman would be among the members of Muslim religion. 
Immunity was granted to the members of Parliament (art. 19).
Administratively, the territory was divided into regions (liuà), provinces (cazà) and dis-
tricts (nahia), headed respectively by a regional commissioner (mutassarif), a delegate 
of the province (caimacams) and a district agent (mudir). These officials would be ap-
pointed “by decree of the Governor, after consultation with a special committee, called 
the Council of Government”, and renewed upon each new election of the local parlia-
ment (art. 25).
Italian citizens of Tripolitania might ask for metropolitan citizenship, if more than 21 
years old, monogamous or unmarried, having a clean record and residing for at least 
five years in Italy or in Tripoli. Apart from these general conditions, they must belong 
to one of a number of special categories, including having past affiliation to a military 
body of the state, Italian educational qualification (at least primary school) or the job of 
a government official.
 The text is largely identical in Cyrenaica, where the statute was enacted a few months 
later (31 October 1919). One variance is in article 13 (“The Government of Cyrenaica 
and its self-administration”), which defines the local parliament, “consisting of repre-
sentatives of local tribes and urban centers, as a friendly federation of all tribes and 
peoples of the country”. The text seems to recognize the importance of tribes and no-
mads in the social rubric of the territory, the autonomy of each tribe and the assembly’s 
federal character. It echoes the observations that Nallino had expressed in his report to 
the Post-war commission, where he had affirmed the need to recognize the specificities 
of Bedouin society.
There was another peculiarity is the composition of the parliament: “about fifty repre-
sentatives […] in the proportion of one in every four thousand members [of the tribe] 
or inhabitants”. The vagueness of the number of the members of parliament was due to 
the imprecision of the available data on the population, about two hundred thousand 
according to this statement, but possibly much less. A subsequent decree67 determinated 
the number of voters using calculations of recognized leaders of different fractions and 
the shuyukh of the tribes, following a complex administrative mechanism pending the 
establishment of the registry office in the colony. If the tribes or their autonomous frac-
tions (and the villages of the interior oases) had less than four thousand members, it 
67 Rd. 270, 25 March 1920: Norme per l’elezione al Parlamento locale e agli altri Consigli elettivi della Cirenaica. See 
Gazzetta ufficiale del Regno d’Italia, 19 May 1920. 
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was considered sufficient to reach fifteen hundred to send a representative to the parlia-
ment.
Yet another difference concerns the division of the territory. While Tripolitania is divided 
into regions, provinces, and districts within specific territorial limits, the population of 
Cyrenaica, according to its traditional constitution, is divided into tribes, sub-tribes and 
their subdivisions. The administration of each sub-tribe was to be left to a chief, and the 
control of each tribe to a chief of chiefs (art. 21). The leaders would continue to be des-
ignated “according to traditional rules”, and would then be recognized by a government 
decree. The creation of the parliament was not to repeal other existing bodies according 
to traditional rules. Particularly, the powers of the council of elders were confirmed, in 
order to oversee “the order and security in the area pertaining to the tribe,” and to be 
“responsible […] in front of the Government” (art. 22). The entire colony is divided 
into districts “for the protection, development and progress of the local interests of each 
territory”: if a district has its capital in a built-up center, it will be a city district or mu-
nicipality, with an administration consisting of a mayor and a council elected every three 
years (art. 26-27).
As for the other chapters (such as financial administration, justice, and metropolitan citi-
zenship) the Cyrenaican statute was not significantly different from that of Tripolitania. 
Ultimately, the main difference between the two statutes was constituted by the
territorial representation rather than the purely individual which was established in 
Cyrenaica, in homage to the still predominantly gentilitial constitution of the country in 
comparison to the more developed neighbouring colony68.
The events that followed the promulgation of the statutes soon made clear the practical 
impossibilities of fully implementing them. The parliament never worked in Tripolita-
nia, and in Cyrenaica it worked for only about two years, from 30 April 1921, to early 
1923.
While in Libya the anti-colonial resistance movement was growing more and more radi-
cal, with demands for autonomy and independence becoming stronger, the political 
developments in Italy were ominously affirming nationalist forces which would reject 
all prospects of compromise and prefer the use of force and military domination. The 
impossibility of a peaceful recognition of Italian supremacy began a long and bloody 
confrontation anew, which would end only with the ‘pacification of Libya’ at the begin-
ning of 1932.
68 G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d’Italia, vol. I, p. 46.
